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Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale
 in Network Industries:
An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution
Abstract
Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure 
industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution 
networks from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost 
efficiency and scale economies. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the 
analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly, especially that smaller utilities’ 
efficiency seems to decrease. Our results emphasise that quality of service should be an 
integrated part of efficiency analysis and in the economic review in regulated natural 
monopolies.
Keywords: efficiency, quality of service, scale economies, input distance function, 
stochastic frontier analysis.
JEL: L15, L51, L94
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1. Introduction
Infrastructure industries, such as electricity, telecommunications, gas, transport, and 
water continue to maintain their strategic importance in modern economies. Since the 
1990s, the globally dominant paradigms governing the structure and ownership models 
of these industries, natural monopoly, vertical integration, and public ownership, have 
been challenged. Liberal models based on competition, economic incentives, and private 
ownership have been adopted to achieve internal and external efficiency improvements 
in these sectors and to benefit customers in the form of lower costs and higher service 
quality.
The electricity sector has witnessed considerable liberalisation activities in many 
countries around the world. The main tenets of electricity sector liberalisation have been 
restructuring, regulation, and privatization. Implementing the new model required 
restructuring of the industries to separate potentially competitive segments (generation 
and retail supply) from natural monopoly activities (distribution and transmission) that 
would need to be regulated. Independent regulation would oversee the successful 
functioning of competitive power markets and regulated transmission and distribution 
networks. Private ownership and profit incentive would promote internal efficiency in 
the firms. Moreover, two important aspects of the new industry structure have been 
widely neglected: the question of (efficient) optimal firm size in natural monopolies and 
its relation to quality of service (QoS).
In competitive markets, competition and market size are important determinants of firm 
size and market concentration (subject to rules and policy). In natural monopolies, in the 
absence of market forces, public intervention, regulation, and history are often factors 
that affect efficiency and scale of firms. Theory characterises natural monopolies to be 
the most technically efficient market structure when a single firm can produce a specific 
output vector at less cost than two or more firms (subadditivity). Subadditive cost 
structures have been theoretically and empirically shown in networks of infrastructure 
industries (e.g. Gilsdorf, 1995 and Salvanes and Tjøtta, 1998). However, the appropriate 
scale (of production) of natural monopolies is also of economic interest. Optimal firm 
size as well as technical efficiency is related to the underlying production technology 
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and structure of an industry. Therefore, in any given industry, the relationship between 
efficiency and scale is an empirical question.
In the context of European electricity sector reform, the natural monopoly characteristics 
and economic importance of firm size and quality of service in distribution networks has 
led to public intervention and regulation in these activities. First, at the time of 
restructuring and unbundling, political decision-makers were faced with decisions 
regarding the number and size of firms. Second, in the post-reform period since the end 
of the 1990s, mergers and acquisitions – vertically and horizontally – increased market 
concentration dramatically and changed the size of the firms requiring an informed 
policy towards this development.1 At the same time, the desirability of having a large 
number of utilities in small countries (e.g. Nordic countries) poses an interesting policy 
question. Third, adoption of incentive regulation models in recent years has given rise to 
concerns that, if left unregulated, the pursuit of profit maximisation is likely to result in 
deterioration of quality of service.
In particular, a formal treatment of QoS from an industrial organisation point of view 
and/or as an integrated part of regulatory analysis has been widely neglected. This is 
especially problematic as there are interactions and trade-offs between utilities’ costs 
(capital as well as operating and maintenance expenditures) and their size and quality of 
services. A simple cost-only approach to efficiency in regulated utilities will, therefore, 
not take an essential aspect of their activities into account. It is conceivable that quality-
incorporated efficiency and scale measures of firms might differ from those of a cost-
only approach. It is therefore important to enhance understanding of the significance of 
quality of service for efficiency and scale in network industries. Specifically, it might be 
that small operations are justified even where they have high costs but provide higher 
service quality and vice versa.
This paper aims to fill the void in previous research and shed some empirical light on 
the effects of including quality dimensions into the analysis of technical efficiency and 
optimal firm size. We estimate technical efficiency and scale economies of a sample of 
1
 For an overview of mergers and acquisitions activity in the European electricity supply industry, cp. 
Codognet et al (2002).
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about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries, applying 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method and multi-output translog input distance 
function models. The outline for the remainder of this paper is as follows. The 
theoretical foundations and previous literature are presented in Section 2. Section 3 
discusses the methodology, and the estimation method. In Section 4 we introduce the 
modelling approach and specify the estimated models. The data is described in Section 
5. Estimation results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 contains conclusions and 
highlights policy implications and directions for future research.
2. Efficiency and Quality of Service
The nature of electricity distribution has been examined in a number of theoretical and 
empirical studies, which predominantly support the existence of natural monopoly 
conditions in distribution networks.2 This section recapitulates the basic conditions of 
natural monopoly theory and reviews previous research on (international) productivity 
analysis, optimal firm size, and on quality of service in network industries. We then 
present two hypotheses regarding the relationship between quality of service, technical 
efficiency, and firm size in electricity distribution networks. 
The natural monopoly characteristics in electricity distribution can be attributed to three 
major aspects (e.g. Growitsch and Wein 2004): the high degree of sunk investments in 
network assets (e.g. power lines and transformers), economies of scale in electricity 
supply, and economies of scope between the major services in electricity distribution, 
namely ‘customer connection’ and ‘energy delivery’.3 In economic theory, a natural 
monopoly is described as a market structure, where it is technically efficient to produce 
a certain output vector by a single firm. Technically, this condition occurs if the cost 
structure of such a market is strictly and globally subadditive for all output vectors Yi, 
i = 1,…,m:
2 For example, Gilsdorf (1994, 1995), Filippini (1998), Salvanes and Tjøtta (1998), and Yatchew
(2000).
3 For a detailed description of outputs in electricity distribution, see Section 4.
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In the case of a single-product firm, economies of scale (declining average costs) and 
concavity (falling marginal costs) are sufficient conditions for subadditivity and 
therefore existence of natural monopoly.4 Baumol (1977) and Baumol et al. (1982) first 
discussed the economic concept of natural monopoly in the context of multi-product 
industries. In multi-output settings, economies of scale and the related property of 
declining-ray average costs are neither necessary nor sufficient for subadditivity of cost 
functions. Instead, in the multi-output context, subadditivity also requires presence of 
economies of joint production, either in the form of cost complementarity or trans-ray 
convexity.5 Cost complementarity holds if inequality 1 is true for incremental as well as 
for total costs (Sharkey, 1982). Figure 1 illustrates the concept of transray convexity 
(here: in connection with economies of scale both in separate and joint production of 
outputs Y1 and Y2). A cost function C for two outputs Y1 and Y2 satisfies the property 
of transray convexity at a point Y if a line through Y shows a negative slope proving 
economies of joint production. The joint production cost function C(Y1+Y2) in Figure 1 
is also concave along all rays through the origin, indicating additional economies of 
scale. Being concave and transray convex, the illustrated cost function satisfies 
sufficient conditions of subadditivity. 
4 Sharkey (1982) presents numerous examples of subadditive cost functions to illustrate that neither 
economies of scale nor concavity are necessary conditions for subadditivity. As the existence of 
natural monopoly conditions in electricity distribution is an established notion, we are going to 
concentrate on more straightforward calculations rather than hypothetical exceptions.
5 See Baumol (1977) and Baumol et al. (1982) for a detailed description of these concepts and 
sufficient conditions for natural monopolies.
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Figure 1: 
Subadditivity in the two-output case
Applying the concept of multi-output production in natural monopolies to electricity 
distribution we focus on analysis of multi-product economies of scale (which is 
equivalent to identifying concavity of the joint cost function in Figure 1), testing for 
existence of economies of joint production, namely economies of scope (which is 
transray convexity in Figure 1). This is appropriate, as the aim of this study is to 
examine optimal utility/service size and the natural monopoly characteristics of 
electricity distribution networks are well-established. Although, there is ample evidence 
that there is considerable variation in efficiency of distribution utilities (e.g. IPART 
1999, Jamasb and Pollitt 2003), the effects of size and quality of service on efficient 
operation and performance of these utilities is less clear.
The reviewed literature points to different economic and methodological aspects that are 
related to the subject matter of this paper. First, a branch of studies has focused on 
international comparisons of network industries including electricity distribution. 
Second, there is a line of literature that analyses most productive scale size in electricity 
distribution. Third, a limited body of literature has addressed the issue of quality of 
service aspect in network industries.
Y1
Y2
0
C(Y1)
C(Y1+Y2)
C(Y2)
Y
C(Y1,Y2)
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Academic research and, to a lesser extent, regulation has used cross-country efficiency 
analyses partly to overcome problems due to a small number of observations, cross-
border mergers, or/and the possibility of collusion among the regulated companies 
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003; Estache et al., 2004). Regulatory use of efficiency analysis 
has largely been limited to single country analysis. Cross-country studies of the 
performance of electric utilities are, however, rather few. In a comparison of UK and US 
distribution utilities, Pollitt (1995) finds a comparable performance in both countries. 
IPART (1999), in a study for the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal in 
Australia focuses primarily on Australian distribution companies, taking UK and New 
Zealand utilities as additional observations. In another comparison of seven Australian 
and 32 international electricity utilities Whiteman (1995) uses an international reference 
set to analyse the development of X-inefficiency in Australian electricity utilities.
In a comparison of Scandinavian and Dutch electricity distribution companies, 
Edvardsen and Førsund (2003) show the advantage of international comparisons in 
identifying peer companies. Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) compare the efficiency of 63 
distribution utilities from six European countries using parametric and non-parametric 
benchmarking methods. They find that efficiency results tend to be rather sensitive in 
level, although not in rank order. Additionally, they report methods of introducing 
comparability in international samples. Analysing panel data of 84 South American 
electricity distributors from eight countries, Estache et al. (2004) point out the 
importance of international benchmarking and the coordination of regulators in order to 
reduce information asymmetries. In a recent study, Hattori et al. (2005) analyse the 
efficiency development of UK and Japanese distribution utilities using panel data from 
1985-1998, reporting an acceleration of productivity growth over time and positive 
economies of scale for UK companies relative to Japanese firms.
Previous research on scale economies and optimal firm size commonly applies the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique to calculate the scale efficiency by comparing 
the efficiency results from constant and variable returns to scale models.6 Empirical 
results from parametric models tend to be rather few and predominantly applied cost 
6 For an introduction see Coelli et al. (1998).
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functions for the analysis. For electricity distribution, an early contribution was by 
Nerlove (1963), who applies a cost function based on a generalized Cobb-Douglas 
production function and gives evidence for the possibility of substitution among factors 
of production. In two studies of Swiss electricity distribution utilities, Filippini (1996) 
and Filippini and Wild (2001) using a flexible translog and a linear average cost 
function find evidence of increasing returns to scale throughout their sample of 39 and 
59 utilities respectively.
Other studies address the issue of minimum efficient scale size. Giles and Wyatt (1993) 
estimate a total cost function from a sample of 60 New Zealand electricity distributors, 
reporting an efficient scale for a sales range of 500 to 3500 GWh. Yatchew (2000) 
converted the results from Giles and Wyatt on a number of customer basis and reports a 
minimum efficient scale size at 30000 customers. Salvanes and Tjøtta (1994) in a cross-
sectional analysis of 100 Norwegian electricity distribution utilities find an optimal firm 
size at about 20,000 customers and that is relatively independent from the GWh sales. 
These results confirm Yatchew’s (2000) findings based on a four-year panel of 81 
Canadian distributors. The study estimated a semi-parametric translog cost function and
reports substantial scale economies and a minimum efficient scale achieved by firms 
with about 20000 customers.
Empirical research on quality of service in network industries is scarce and mostly 
concentrated on telecommunications sector (Resende and Façanha, 2004; Sappington, 
2002; Ai and Sappington, 1998; Kridel et al., 1996). For the electricity sector, Ter-
Martirosyan (2003) analyses the effect of incentive regulation on duration and frequency 
of electric outages for a panel of 78 U.S. utilities, reporting an increase in the duration of 
outages associated with incentive regulation. The study also finds that outages decrease 
when explicit quality benchmarks are introduced. Korhonen and Syrjänen (2003) find 
improvement in technical efficiency after incorporating quality of service (interruption 
time per customer) in their DEA analysis of 106 Finish distribution utilities. CEPA 
(2003) applies a two step DEA model to cross-sectional data for the UK and finds no 
significant correlation between technical efficiency measures and service quality in 
terms of minutes lost per customer. Ajodhia et al. (2004) apply a DEA and a Corrected 
Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) model to a cross-sectional sample of 44 electric utilities 
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from four countries (UK, Netherlands, Hungary and Malaysia), reporting a significant 
efficiency increase when quality is taken into account especially for smaller utilities. 
Giannakis et al. (2005) carried out a quality incorporated efficiency study with panel 
data on UK electricity distribution. They show that technical efficiency does not 
necessarily also involve high service quality and state that quality incorporated 
regulatory benchmarking is superior to cost-only approaches.
The relationship of efficiency, firm size, and quality in regulated network industries has 
not been addressed previously. Kwoka (2005) is an exception, who in an analysis of 
private and public U.S. electric utilities estimates a quadratic cost function and reports 
lower distribution costs and higher quality in terms of lower duration of interruptions for 
smaller (public) companies. However, he did not apply frontier analysis and was not 
able  to measure individual company efficiency.
Our review of natural monopoly theory and previous studies on electricity distribution 
suggests that important aspects of industry structure have not been addressed. The first 
issue is the relationship between technical efficiency and firm size. Insofar as economies 
of scale exist, larger firms are expected to demonstrate higher technical efficiency 
ceteris paribus. This relationship also applies to economies of scope between outputs 
(e.g. customer numbers and energy supplied). Natural monopoly theory would then 
suggest increasing service area size until scale economies are exploited.
Inclusion of the quality dimension into technical efficiency analysis might alter the 
optimal firm size. Kwoka presents the hypothesis, that smaller utilities supply higher 
quality, as they have easier access to local market and customer specific information 
(such as demand characteristics and special technical conditions), being important for 
service quality and reliability. Moreover, organizational aspects such as multiple 
objectives combined with observability of results and measurement problems in large 
firms can explain higher quality of service in small firms (Holmström, 1989 and Dixit, 
1997). In addition, quality criteria are difficult to specify and to enforce (Kwoka, 2005). 
Also, it has been argued that closeness to customer leads to higher quality of service.7 If 
7 However, it should be mentioned that some degree of self-selection may exist as small firms with low 
quality of service may have gradually been acquired by larger and more efficient firms.
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the above proposition holds, incorporating quality of service in electricity distribution 
utilities’ production function and technical efficiency measurement could reduce 
economies of scale and decrease optimal utility size relative to a pure cost analysis. The 
following two main hypotheses can be drawn:
(i) In a pure cost efficiency analysis, the natural monopoly characteristics 
(economies of scale and scope) in electricity distribution can be assumed to 
produce a higher efficiency associated with firm size (‘economies of scale’ 
hypothesis).
(ii) The relative cost and efficiency advantage of large firms declines when quality 
of service is taken into account. (‘proximity to customers’ hypothesis).
We test these hypotheses by applying stochastic frontier analysis and distance functions 
to examine the technical efficiency, scale economies and scope economies of electricity 
distribution utilities using a pure cost and combined cost-quality analysis. 
3. Methodology
Shephard (1953, 1970) proposed the distance function approach for specifying the 
production technology of a multi-output multi-input firm. When analysing regulated 
industries this approach has advantages over cost or revenue functions since the 
behavioural assumptions of the latter approaches are likely to be violated (Estache et al., 
2004).8 Distance functions can be differentiated into input and output distance 
functions. The former describes the maximum radial contraction of the input vector 
while keeping the output vector constant. The latter gives information about the 
maximum producible output given an input vector. For the purpose of this study, we use 
the input distance function approach as outputs of electricity distribution networks are 
exogenously determined due to the derived nature of demand (i.e. that is distribution of 
a given amount of energy demanded to a given number of customers) for their output.
8 Estache et al. (2004) refer to a violation of standard assumptions (for example profit maximisation or 
efficient production) in production economics due to regulation and public ownership.
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The input distance function summarizing all economically relevant characteristics of the 
production technology can be defined as
DI (X,Y)=max{ : (X/) L(Y)} (2)
where the input set L(Y) represents the set of all input vectors X that can produce 
outputs Y. We assume this production technology satisfies the properties discussed in 
Färe and Primont (1995). From XL(Y) follows that DI (X,Y)  1, equalling unity for 
any company on the frontier of the input set. The input distance function has some 
additional properties, it is linear homogenous and concave in X. The translog 
(transcendental logarithmic) functional form, originally introduced as a cost function 
model by Christensen et al. (1973), has several virtues, which apply to a distance 
function as well (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The translog input distance function is 
flexible and allows imposition of assumptions from microeconomic theory such as 
homogeneity, symmetry and monotonicity.
When defined for the case of K inputs and M outputs, the translog input distance 
function is specified as
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(3)
with  ,   and   being parameters to be estimated and i denoting the ith firm of the 
sample. To impose the properties proposed by microeconomic theory, some constraints 
on the unknown parameters are required. Symmetry is given if the second order 
coefficients satisfy
MmKknmmnlkkl ,...,2,1and,...,2,1for and ====  . (4)
The restrictions required for homogeneity of degree + 1 in inputs are
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Based on the above formalisation, it is possible to calculate additional economic 
characteristics of the corresponding technology. A focal point of this study is the 
analysis of optimal firm size. As shown above, this is related to scale elasticities and 
returns to scale, which can be obtained from the input distance function as shown by 
Färe and Primont (1995). For the multi-output case, returns to scale can be defined as 
follows:
yxyD
RTS I ),(
1


= . (8)
where ),( xyID  is the vector of first order partial derivatives of the distance function 
with respect to outputs (Rungsuriyawiboon and O’Donnell, 2004). Values of RTS 
greater than one indicate increasing returns to scale, whereas values smaller than one 
imply decreasing returns to scale. The optimal firm size is where RTS equals unity; 
constant returns to scale are a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal scale size in 
electricity distribution. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between scale economies and 
scale efficiency. The latter is, in a parametric setting, equivalent to the ray average 
productivity at the observed input bundle relative to the constant returns to scale input 
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vector and differs from the scale economy value except for bundles of constant returns 
to scale (Morrison-Paul et al., 2004).9 We calculate the returns to scale as the negative 
inverse of the scale elasticities: the (negative) scale elasticity is defined as the sum of 
production elasticities:
ln
ln
I
DIY
mm
D
y


 = 

 . (9)
As Morrison-Paul et al. (2004) state, this formula is consistent with Equation 8 and 
conceptually comparable to the multi-output cost elasticities in Baumol et al. (1982).
Indeed, this measure f multi-product scale elasticities includes economies of joint 
production. Denny and Pinto (1978) showed that economies of joint production (scope 
economies) exist in translog functions if *m n mn  < . To control for joint production 
effects, we impose the constraint *mn m n  =   into the scale elasticity formula and 
calculate a net scale elasticity measure. Subtracting net scale elasticity from the scale 
elasticity defined in formula 9 gives a measure of economies of scope.
Atkinson and Primont (2002) show that it is possible to calculate ‘implicit input value 
shares’ (Rungsuriyawiboon and O’Donnell, 2004) for any input k by
ln
ln
I I
k
I
k k
xD D
x xD

 

=

 

. (10)
Ratios of these derivatives can be interpreted as a unit-less rate of input substitution 
(Rungsuriyawiboon and O’Donnell, 2004).
In order to estimate firm specific technical efficiency, we apply stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA), originally introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977). SFA is a parametric method which can also estimate an efficient or best 
practice frontier from a distance function model and firm specific deviations (i.e. 
inefficiency) from the frontier in the form of technical efficiency scores (see e.g. Coelli 
9 See Ray (1999, 2003), Balk (2001), and Orea (2002) for more detailed discussions.
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et al. 1998). The estimated technical efficiency scores range between 1 and 0 where a 
score of 1 means that a firm is the most efficient in the sample and is on the efficient 
frontier while 0 represents the least efficiency.
Imposing the restrictions specified above, a stochastic frontier model of firm i can be 
modelled as follows (Coelli and Perelman 1999, Rungsuriyawiboon and O’Donnell, 
2004):
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where  ,   and   are unknown parameters,  is a random error term, and ui = IiDln
is the (non-negative) technical inefficiency term. The error term  is distributed as iid
N(0, 2), for u we assume a truncated normal distribution N+(m, 2) as suggested by 
Stevenson (1980).
In order to capture systematic differences in exogenous factors between firms, we also 
include environmental variables to allow variation of a company’s mean efficiency, 
assuming environmental factors directly affecting technical efficiency. As suggested by 
Battese and Coelli (1995), we assume the mean of the truncated normal distributed 
inefficiency term to be a linear function of environmental variables z (here as country 
dummies or density factors). For our model, m is specified as:
0
1
S
i s si
s
m z 
=
= + (12)
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), we estimate the coefficients  ,  ,   and   , the 
standard deviations of the error components vu  and , the total error variance 
222
vu  += and the ratio of the variance of the inefficiency component to the total 
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error variance 22  u= .   is bounded between zero and unity and indicates the 
relative contribution of inefficiency to total error variance.
The technical efficiency scores are calculated following the procedure by Coelli et al.
(1999). Technical efficiency for the i-th firm in a set of cross-sectional data is defined 
by:
*
*2
*
*
[exp( )]
1
exp
2
i i i
i
i
i
TE E u 
µ 

µ 
µ

= 
  
         =  +  ! " ! "    # $     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(13)
with
0 ,
1
(1 )
S
i s s i i
s
zµ    
=
 
=  +  
  
 (14)
and
2 2
* (1 )   =  (15)
4. Modelling Approach and Estimation Strategy
We now turn to the modelling of the electricity distribution technology. First, we specify 
the relevant input and output variables for the stochastic frontier model. Second, we 
specify the functional form of the models to be estimated. Concerning the variables, 
previous research on efficiency measurement in electricity distribution has used a 
variety of variables and models (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). This may be explained partly 
by lack of data and partly by the nature of issues addressed (Hattori et al., 2005).
In order to estimate relative efficiency and optimal firm size when taking the quality 
dimension into account, we specify two basic models. The first model (Cost-Only) 
focuses on efficiency only and consists of one input variable and three output variables. 
A single cost input is used to represent total expenditures (TOTEX) or total cash cost in 
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monetary terms defined as the sum of operating expenditures (OPEX) and capital 
expenditures (CAPEX). While OPEX represents operating and maintenance (O&M) 
costs, CAPEX represents the annual gross capital outlays of a company. Using a single 
monetary measure for inputs facilitates international comparison, as it reflects 
differences in relative factor prices and substitution between OPEX and CAPEX among 
the countries. The issues of differences in cost levels, accounting rules, currencies 
conversion and other input level influencing factors will be discussed later.
The second model (Cost-Quality) incorporates quality of service by using the number of 
customer minutes lost (CML) for each firm. CML represents the continuity dimension of 
quality of service, it measures the average duration of outages per connected customer 
and is a proxy for service reliability. Following Yaisawarng and Klein (1994) and 
Giannakis et al. (2005), we treat outage duration as an undesirable input, assuming a 
substitutive relationship between total spending and duration of outages. In an input 
distance function model, an efficient firm can reduce CML and cost while maintaining a 
given level of outputs.
Electricity distribution utilities operate in a regulated environment and provide a 
required amount of energy to a given number of customers as a joint service. The two 
elements of this service, electricity delivered and number of customers supplied, can be 
treated separately, as they (i) drive different costs, and (ii) interact with each other 
technically. Therefore, we use two output variables in the cost-only and the cost-quality 
models. These variables have been identified based on the “separate marketability of 
components” property suggested by Neuberg (1977), that is total number of customers
and number of energy units supplied measured in Gigawatt-hours (GWh). The two 
output variables also reflect the structure of a two-part tariff, i.e. a fixed charge per 
customer as well as a variable part dependent on consumed energy. In addition, 
economies of scope between customers and supplied energy have been theoretically 
identified based on advantages in load-management due to a lower risk of stochastic 
demand effects (law of large numbers) and the possibility of pooling non-perfectly 
correlated demands to flatten total demand (Brunekreeft, 2003). These effects gain 
importance with increasing number of customers, relating economies of scope to 
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economies of scale. A separate analysis of number of customers and energy units 
delivered allows the identification of economies of scale and scope.
In addition to input and output variables, environmental factors can influence the 
technical efficiency of a firm but are beyond managerial control. We use customer 
density (number of customer per network kilometre) as an environmental variable to 
control for density advantages. A set of country dummy variables is used to capture 
national differences such as ownership structure, regulation (antitrust rules), different 
objectives for utilities as well as differences in historical developments regarding size of 
service area and regulation regime.
Since the translog functional form requires an approximation of an underlying function 
to a specific point of the sample, we correct the variables by sample means. This 
procedure reduces the influence of outliers without affecting the structure of data. In 
addition, the first order coefficients can be interpreted as estimates of production 
elasticities at sample means (Coelli et al., 2003).
For the cost-only model (Model I), the outputs are energy delivered and number of 
customers, and the single input is total expenditures (TOTEX). Inclusion of country 
dummies as environmental variables allows us to adjust estimates of relative efficiency 
for structural differences which might be attributed to the regulatory regime, historical 
industry structure and results of former regulation. Moreover, we control for the 
differences in customer density which is expected to have an effect on firm-specific 
technical efficiency.
( )
0 1 2
2 2
11 22
12
ln
ln ln
1 1ln ln
2 2
ln *ln
i
i i
TOTEX
energy customers
energy customers
energy customers
v u
  
 

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+ +
+ +
+
+ 
(16)
and,
denscustNethItNoSwFiUKi _0 µ +++++++= (17)
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We now extend the discussion to a cost-quality model (Model II), which incorporates 
customer minutes lost as a second input.
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1 11
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and,
denscustNethItNoSwFiUKi _0 µ +++++++= (19)
Table 1 shows the inputs, outputs, and environmental variables used in our models.
Table 1:
Specification of models
Variable Model I Model II
Inputs
TOTEX  
CML 
Outputs
No. of customers  
Units of energy (GWh)  
Environmental Factors (z)
Country dummies  
Customer density  
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5. Data and Descriptive Information
The data set used for this study consists of 505 electricity distribution utilities from eight 
European countries, namely Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. The data was collected from national regulators and 
utility associations for the financial year 2002. This section describes in detail how the 
data was harmonized and processed.
Using monetary values of input variables from an international data set bears some 
problems, the most relevant being comparability. As stated in Edvardsen and Førsund 
(2003), the range of practical alternatives for harmonizing is small. We convert the 
financial data to a single monetary unit, the euro, as suggested in Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2003). Five of eight countries in the sample have euro as their common currency. As 
conventional exchange rates do not fully cover country specific differences in price level 
and purchasing power, we adjusted the OPEX and CAPEX with the comparative price 
levels for 2002 using purchasing power parities (OECD, 2004).10 Table 2 shows 
descriptive information of the data set, the variables and their average values. Table 3 
describes the variables and summary statistics of data used.
10
 Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) in a Data Envelopment Analysis of efficiency of electricity distribution 
networks (in Norway, UK, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal) found a correlation coefficient of 0.99 
between the efficiency scores when using PPP vs. using exchange rates. Furthermore, 4 out of 7 
countries share a common currency, bearing difficulties accounting for relative price level differences 
when using currency rates.
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Table 2:
Number of utilities in the sample
Country Number of 
utilities
Energy supplied 
(GWh)
No. of 
customers
Network 
length (km)
TOTEX 
(in 000€)
CML
(mean) (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean)
United 
Kingdom 14 22,249 1,953,809 54,669 218,733 86.36
Ireland 1 21,208 1,737,616 164,553 658,016 398.00
Netherlands 7 13,340 851,894 254,835 254,835 16.66
Finland 99 483 32,879 4,126 30,436 136.23
Norway 143 504 17,872 2,084 8,248 240.72
Sweden 223 398 20,576 1,807 6,495 34.62
Italy 8 Enel departments 26,626 3,658,791 129,505 176,766 142.26
Spain 4 50,689 5,784,686 154,707 2,256,987 0.14
Table 3:
Variables and summary statistics
Variable Min Max Mean Median
No. of customers (in 000) 0.004 10,262.00 197.38 10.34
Energy supplied (GWh) 0.290 85,080 2,128 220
Network length (km) 10 280,166 7,866 987
TOTEX (in 000€) 79.14 3,812,540 43,668 4,224
CML .00 4834.68 117.02 43.39
As shown in the Table 2, the number of companies and the mean parameter values per 
country varies widely. For the UK, Ireland, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain, our 
sample is a near complete inventory count of utilities. For the Netherlands, separate 
financial data was not available for 2002 and we aggregated the technical and quality 
variables at the holding company level. Data for Italy’s Enel distribution region 
information was aggregated from 19 sub-departments to 8 departments. Despite the data 
aggregation in both Italy and the Netherlands, our data set covers nearly the whole of the 
national distribution networks. The large differences between the countries (Table 2) 
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and the minimum and maximum values of variables (Table 3) demands interpretation of 
results with care; on the other hand, it allows an unbiased identification of optimal firm 
size across a wider range.
Concerning our hypotheses, the descriptive statistics show interesting relationships 
between costs, firm size, and quality of service. The plot of total expenditures against 
number of customer shows a decreasing increase in costs (Figure 2). On a per customer 
basis, Figure 3 indicates a cost advantage for larger companies, supporting the 
economies of scale hypothesis.
Figure 2:
Total expenses and firm size
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Total expenses per customer and firm size
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Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the quality dimension (i.e. customer minute lost) against 
the number of customers as the relevant dimension of firm size. The figure shows that 
smaller firms exhibit a higher degree of service quality, supporting our proximity to 
customer hypothesis.
We controlled the data for outliers by applying the method suggested by Hadi (1992, 
1994), which identifies multiple outliers in multivariate data. For the Model I, 15 
observations were dropped and another 5 observations due to missing data. Data for 
Model II is adjusted for 34 outliers in total; after dropping 17 observations due to 
missing data, another 17 cases where eliminated based on Hadi’s method.11
11 Applying the procedure suggested dropping all observations from Spain. To avoid systematic biases, 
we dropped the Spanish utilities for the cost-only model as well.
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Figure 4:
Quality of service and firm size
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6. Results
In this section we discuss the results of the estimated models, beginning with an analysis 
of technical efficiency and economies of scale for the cost-only Model I. We then extend 
the discussion to the quality incorporated model Model II.
Analysing the cost-only Model I (Table 4) the following conclusions can be drawn. The 
first order coefficients of ln energy and ln customer are statistically significant and show 
the expected signs. Also, the input TOTEX increases with both increasing energy 
delivered and number of customers. The country dummies and customer density 
influencing technical efficiency scores produce the following results. Five out of seven 
country variables are significant and can be interpreted as that the dummies for Nordic 
countries are all positive, indicating significant higher technical inefficiency for 
companies from Sweden, Norway or Finland. Customer density influences the technical 
efficiency score as expected, with increasing customer density, technical efficiency 
scores increase as well (to be exact, the negative sign represents a negative effect on 
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inefficiency).12 The monotonicity restriction is not violated and the Wald 2%  test 
confirms a systematic influence by explanatory variables at 99% level of significance.
Table 4:
Cost-Only Model I
ln Energy -0.4993***[-2.79] ln
2 -1.037***[-8.29]
ln Customer -0.4054**[-2.40] inv log 
0.004
[0.01]
½ (ln Energy)2 0.4092[1.50]
2 0.3546
½ (ln Customer)2 0.4194*[1.69]  0.5011
ln Energy *
ln Customer
-0.4138
[-1.61]
2
v 0.1769
Constant 0.4383***[3.72]
2
u 0.1777
z UK -0.212[-0.19] Log-likelihood -403.5747
z Finland 1.613***[8.45] Wald 
2% 1476.23[0.000]
z Sweden 0.544*[1.69] N 485
z Norway 1.094***[4.68]
z Italy -15.453[-0.45]
z Netherlands 1.193***[2.92]
z Customer / km -10.547*[-1.83]
Significant on 10%-. 5%-. and 1%-level: *, **, and ***; z value in parentheses.
The relationship between technical efficiency and utility size in Model I indicates 
presence of considerable economies of scale: While the mean technical efficiency score 
is 0.45 for small utilities and 0.49 for medium sized utilities respectively, the larger 
12 We suppressed the environmental variables constant to obtain better interpretable results.
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utilities show a mean score of nearly 0.80.13 This relation holds for the different 
countries as well, while the UK (0.84) and Italy (0.82) show very efficient distribution 
utilities, firms from Nordic countries tend to be rather inefficient. An interesting and not 
expected result are the comparatively low efficiency scores for Ireland (0.54) and the 
Netherlands (0.45). However, the confidence intervals of the efficiency scores are large 
and to some extent overlap. This indeed coincides with other research and does not alter 
the results in general.14
Also, returns to scale in relation to number of customers, economies of scale can be 
found throughout the sample. The RTS measure remains constant at about 1.1, which is 
the observed scale economies at the sample mean as well.15 Concerning the issue of 
optimal firm size, these findings suggest that even the largest firms in the sample have 
not exploited all scale economies; a further increase of the joint output vector seems 
reasonable for the entire sample.
For the Model II with incorporated customer minutes lost as an additional input factor, 
we estimated a two input two-output translog input distance function (Table 5). The first 
order coefficients of ln energy, ln customer, and ln cml (normalized by TOTEX 
variable) are highly significant and show the expected signs. While total expenditures 
increase with energy delivered and number of customers, customer minutes lost 
decrease with cost, indicating a trade-off relation between cost and quality. Again, five 
out of seven environmental variables are significantly influencing firm’s technical (in) 
efficiency.16 The Nordic firms as well as those from the Netherlands are significantly 
less efficient. The control variable for customer density shows a highly significant 
13 This analysis is based on the gross technical efficiency scores (see Coelli, Perelman and Romano
1999). Calculating net technical efficiency scores as suggested by Coelli et al. reduces the efficiency 
differences between small and large firms but does not alter the relation in general.
14 To estimate the confidence intervals of the technical efficiency scores, we applied the procedure 
suggested in Horrace and Schmidt (1996) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). In Kumbhakar and 
Lovell (2000), formula (3.2.34) contains a typo. We thank William C. Horrace for bringing this to 
our attention. The interested reader may be referred to Horrace and Schmidt (2000).
15 Applying the procedure of testing for economies of joint production (Denny and Pinto 1978) 
indicates that this result of constant scale economies throughout the sample cannot be explained by 
scope economies. This seems to be counter-intuitive, as a comparable RTS measure for Model 2 can 
clearly be described by increasing economies of scope with firm size (see below).
16 Again, we suppressed the environmental variables constant to obtain better interpretable results.
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negative relation between number of customers per kilometre of network length and 
technical inefficiency. As in Model I, the monotonicity restriction is not violated. The 
Wald 2%  test confirms a systematic influence by explanatory variables at 99% level of 
significance.
The estimated efficiency scores clearly contradict the proximity to customer hypothesis. 
While small firms show the lowest mean efficiency scores (0.38), technical efficiency 
increases to 0.44 for medium sized and 0.81 for large firms.17 Again, this relationship 
holds for the countries as well. Italy (0.99) and the UK (0.82) show rather high mean 
efficiency scores while Finish (0.22) and Norwegian (0.30) utilities are inefficient on 
average. An exception among the Nordic countries is Sweden with a mean quality 
adjusted technical efficiency of the companies of 0.55. In cost-quality terms a 
comparatively inefficient utility can be found in Ireland (0.37), Dutch firms show a 
mean technical efficiency of 0.51. As in Model I, the confidence intervals of the 
technical efficiency score are rather large and indicate coincidental differences in 
technical efficiency to a certain extent.
17 The net technical efficiency scores are less different between small and large firms; but again, this 
relation still holds in general.
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Table 5:
Cost-Quality Model II
ln Energy -0.3944**[-2.51] ln
2 -1.262***[-13.84]
ln Customer -0.3440**[-2.43] inv log 
0.929**
[2.20]
½ (ln Energy)2 -0.0483[-0.18]
2 0.2830
½ (ln Customer)2 0.2070[0.90]  0.7168
ln Energy *
ln Customer
-0.0685
[-0.28]
2
v 0.0801
ln (CML/TOTEX) 0.2764***[6.12]
2
u 0.2028
½ (ln CML/TOTEX)2 0.0420***[4.09] Log-likelihood -333.1597
ln (CML/TOTEX) *
ln Energy
-0.1796***
[-3.24] Wald 
2% 2561.28[0.000]
ln (CML/TOTEX) *
ln Customer
0.2169***
[3.93] N 471
Constant 0.7067***[6.79]
z UK 0.068[0.09]
z Finland 1.847***[12.43]
z Sweden 0.809***[4.39]
z Norway 1.384***[8.12]
z Italy -16.234[-0.36]
z Netherlands 1.227***[3.34]
Significant on 10%-. 5%-. and 1%-level: *, **, and ***; z value in parentheses.
Analysing the returns to scale in relation to number of customers, economies of scale 
can be found throughout the sample with RTS at about 1.2 on average. Testing for 
economies of joint production (Denny and Pinto 1978) shows decreasing net returns to 
scale as well as increasing economies of scope with firm size. Net returns to scale are 
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homogenously decreasing throughout the sample, scale economies can be found for 
utilities below 183,000 customers (see Figure 5, dark squares).18 We calculated positive 
scope economies for utilities with more than 108,000 customers (Figure 5, light 
triangles).19 These findings support the assumed relation of energy supplied and number 
of customers: At a certain utility size, stochastic scale advantages or positive effects of 
pooling demand seem to develop. Our findings emphasize that the existence of scale 
related scope economies drive optimal firm size. Indeed, gross RTS scores above one 
for even the largest companies militate for an optimal utility size beyond the maximum 
observed number of customers in our sample. This result has to be treated with care as it 
is sensitive to the curvature of our estimated function. Nevertheless, for the given data 
set the results are viable.
Figure 5:
Net RTS, scope economies, and number of customers
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18 We obtained this result be estimating a logged trend function in a scatter plot diagram of returns to 
scale and number of customers, setting the trend equation to one and solving for the number of 
customers (R2 = 0.2317).
19 This result was obtained by estimating a logged trend function in a scatter plot diagram of economies 
of scope and number of customers, setting the trend equation to one and solving for the number of 
customers (R2 = 0.2477).
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The relationship between the two inputs total expenditures and customer minutes lost, 
indicates that the ratio of the CML elasticity to the TOTEX elasticity increases with firm 
size (Figure 6). This measure of factor substitutability indicates that large utilities might 
be technically better able to increase quality of service at a given output level (by 
increasing total costs) while small utilities cannot substitute total expenses against 
quality to such an extent.
Figure 6:
Input substitution and firm size - Model II
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Comparing and recapitulating the results from Models I and II, empirical evidence 
clearly supports the economies of scale hypothesis. In both the pure and the quality 
adjusted model, technical efficiency increases with firm size. Additionally, the 
efficiency differences are rather substantial. The efficiency differences in relation to firm 
size reflect the differences across countries as well. Countries with large utilities such as 
Italy and the UK show considerably higher mean technical efficiency scores than 
countries with smaller companies as the Nordic countries.
An interesting and somewhat unexpected result is that the proximity to the customer 
hypothesis can be rejected with confidence; empirical observations even give evidence 
to the contrary (Table 6). While incorporating quality of service increases average 
technical efficiency of large firms (and countries with predominantly large firms), 
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efficiency of small firms decreases substantially. Regressing the (logged) TE scores of 
Model II by those of Model I clearly support this finding; the TE scores are significantly 
negatively correlated, correlation is around 0.96.
Table 6:
Comparison of technical efficiency of Models I and II
Model Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average 
Change
Cost-only TE 0.4503 0.1722 0.1129 0.9255
Small firms*
Cost-quality TE 0.3765 0.1768 0.0591 0.8193
-16.40%
Cost-only TE 0.4926 0.2004 0.1234 0.9885
Medium firms*
Cost-quality TE 0.4352 0.2176 0.0946 0.9868
-11.66%
Cost-only TE 0.7963 0.1985 0.3380 0.9894
Large firms*
Cost-quality TE 0.8106 0.1788 0.3661 0.9891
1.80%
Cost-only TE 0.8353 0.0274 0.7727 0.8854
UK
Cost-quality TE 0.8191 0.0658 0.6350 0.9106
-1.94%
Cost-only TE 0.2507 0.1164 0.1129 0.7922
Finland
Cost-quality TE 0.2222 0.1345 0.0738 0.8883
-11.39%
Cost-only TE 0.6189 0.1235 0.1281 0.9255
Sweden
Cost-quality TE 0.5523 0.1659 0.0591 0.8671
-10.76%
Cost-only TE 0.5381 0.0000 0.5381 0.5381
Ireland
Cost-quality TE 0.3661 0.0000 0.3661 0.3661
-31.96%
Cost-only TE 0.3782 0.0549 0.2647 0.5516
Norway
Cost-quality TE 0.3008 0.0676 0.1749 0.5472
-20.46%
Cost-only TE 0.8169 0.0265 0.7720 0.8436
Italy
Cost-quality TE 0.9891 0.0003 0.9885 0.9894
21.07%
Cost-only TE 0.4445 0.1058 0.3380 0.5951Netherlands
Cost-quality TE 0.5123 0.1143 0.3355 0.6477
15.26%
*
 Small firms are defined as being part of the 50% percentile of number of customers, medium firm are within the 
50% to 95% percentile, large firms are the largest 5%.
Figure 7 visualizes the differences in level and distribution of TE scores between 
Models I and II. The scatter plots of technical efficiency and number of customers show 
size advantages for both models; the distribution of the scores however is different. In 
Model I, the scores are less dispersed and the average technical efficiency is slightly 
higher. The scatter plot of Model II supports the results shown in Table 6. While small 
and especially less efficient firms seem to suffer from the inclusion of service quality 
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into the analysis, large and efficient firms seem to benefit in terms of efficiency scores. 
This result shows, illustrated in Figure 6, that large firms can supply quality at lower 
cost.
Figure 7:
Technical efficiency and firm size - Models I and II
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7. Conclusions
Our analysis of the relationship between firm size, technical efficiency, and quality of 
service for European electricity distribution utilities sho s evidence of significant 
economies of scale in electricity distribution networks. In addition, we found economies 
of scope between energy delivered and number of customers can be observed among 
larger firms.
Concerning quality of service and firm size, the results are ambiguous: our descriptive 
results indicate that small firms perform better in terms of quality of service. Since 
provision of quality is related to level of costs, this finding alone is not conclusive; the 
cost-quality models revealed that large utilities are technically more efficient even when 
Page 31 of 39
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
33
quality is controlled for, indicating that larger firms can supply a given level of quality 
of service at lower cost. Therefore, the hypothesis of customer proximity was rejected.
Regarding natural monopoly theory, the “proper” size of the natural monopoly utility 
does not appear to be affected when quality is incorporated in the analysis. Our analysis 
of the mean technical efficiency of utilities confirms the findings on firm size; we found 
significant differences among the countries and showed that smaller utilities and 
countries with smaller firms (i.e. Nordic utilities) tend be significantly less efficient than 
large utilities from, for example, Italy or the UK. Additionally, the relationship between 
input elasticities (factor substitution) indicates that larger companies might, in contrast 
to small utilities, be able to increase quality more easily by increasing total expenses. 
These findings contradict previous studies on optimal utility size, such as Yatchew 
(2000) and Salvanes and Tjøtta (1994). While they found optimal size at a rather low 
scale; our analysis shows unexploited scale economies throughout the sample, 
indicating that utility size should be increased further even for large companies. These 
differences might be explained by basically three different factors. First, our analysis is 
based on a significantly larger sample with a broader range of firms. Second, in contrast 
to those previous studies, our sample includes a variety of comparably very large firms. 
And third, the positive scale ecnomies throughout the sample can be explained by the 
relationship of firm size and economies of scope between number of customers and 
delivered energy, which has not been analysed in detail before.
The policy implications from our study are threefold. First, the possibility of factor 
substitution indicates the option of an increase in quality of service when appropriately 
regulated especially in countries with large utilities. This might diminish the current 
quality advantages of small utilities. Second, countries with a large number of small 
utilities should allow mergers in order to exploit potential gains. Third, in order to avoid 
collusion among utilities against regulatory agencies, we suggest a European 
harmonisation of data definition and collection and regulatory accounts to facilitate 
international comparisons and benchmarking.
Future research on technical efficiency, firm size and quality of service in network 
industries in general and electricity distribution in particular should address the issue of 
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productivity development over time. This would require panel data analysis to control 
for cyclical effects and to overcome the shortcomings of cross-sectional analyses. 
Another important aspect, not addressed in this study, is the relationship between 
efficiency, quality, and ownership structure. Publicly owned utilities may, due to 
differing managerial or corporate objectives, exhibit different performance in terms of 
efficiency from private companies. Finally, the socio-economic costs of outages as well 
as the cost of quality improvement need to be incorporated in the analysis in order to 
improve incentive regulation schemes for quality of service.
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